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Introduction
How long does it take for a book to become a classic? In the case of Charles Tay-
lor’s A Secular Age, seven years clearly were more than enough. Since its publi-
cation in 2007, the Canadian philosopher’s book has inspired wide discussion
and generated an astonishing number of responses. What is more, the debate
has been taking place in a wide range of disciplines: philosophy and sociology,
theology and history, political science and literature, anthropology and religious
studies, and other fields. In the English language alone there have been far more
than 100 direct responses to or reviews of the book since its publication in 2007
(see the annotated bibliography at the end of this volume).
The contributions to the present volume are equally varied. This is a good
thing: no contribution in itself can do justice to Taylor’s rich work. Rather, the
individual responses to A Secular Age might better be understood as illuminating
its manifold aspects from various angles, and only in their collectivity might they
approach something like a ‘complete picture.’ Part of this picture is that some
contributors engage more critically with A Secular Age than others, and that Tay-
lor’s book can be more fruitfully worked with in some disciplines than in others.
With contributions from nine disciplines, this volume illustrates the enormous
potential of Taylor’s work for interdisciplinary research. It also points to certain
limits in this regard.
Stories
The volume is structured around the concept of ‘story.’ Taylor himself writes that
“[i]t is a crucial fact of our present spiritual predicament that it is historical; [….]
In other words, our sense of where we are is crucially defined in part by a story of
how we got there” (ASA¹: 29). He offers this in part as a defense of the length of
his own book, which audaciously toggles between nuanced intellectual and cul-
tural history, broad empirical observations, philosophical analysis, and norma-
tive claims. This generic blend has sometimes been misunderstood by readers,
who may wish for something else: more empirical data, perhaps, or less histor-
ical texture. But the mixture is crucial to Taylor’s own story, which aims among
 Throughout this volume, reference to A Secular Age is made by “ASA,” departing from the
general style of references, which would demand “Taylor .”
other things to get us to feel or sense what it is like to live in a secular age. In this
regard, Taylor’s “story” demands a kind of interpretive work from its readers,
particularly because good stories, or those we deem classics, are always suscep-
tible to multiple interpretations.
In a fundamental sense, A Secular Age retells the story of (Western) secula-
rization in order to understand who we are and how we came to be that way.
Whilst Taylor does not negate common descriptions of secularity as consisting
of social differentiation or the decreasing relevance of religion in the public
sphere (which he terms “secularity 1”) or as a decline in religious belief and
practice (“secularity 2”), his focus is on what he introduces as “secularity 3,”
namely the background assumptions against which an age or era shows up as
“secular.” “Why,” he asks, “was it virtually impossible not to believe in God
in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 2000 many of us find this not
only easy, but even inescapable?” (ASA: 25).
One answer to that question is what Taylor calls “subtraction stories” (ASA:
22). Subtraction stories offer causal accounts of the spread of secularity: the rise
of science and growing urbanization and industrialization brings about an inevi-
table decline of religion. Taylor opposes this linear description of the gradual
decline of religion in human history by describing the vicissitudes and contin-
gencies of religious change as a “zig zag” (ASA: 95). More importantly, he inves-
tigates the normative underpinnings of secularity itself, which he understands as
something that was built (sometimes deliberately, sometimes haphazardly) rath-
er than simply exposed by the subtraction of religion. This alternative story is
what Taylor calls a “Reform Master Narrative.” For Taylor, (Western) secularity
originates in Christianity, more specifically in a drive for reform that is both theo-
logical and behavioral, and which gathered momentum in the early modern pe-
riod. A summary of this narrative can be found in the first chapter by Matthias
Koenig and, with a slightly different focus, in the subsequent contribution by
Günter Thomas. It is important to stress that Taylor’s “Reform” is not the same
as the Protestant Reformation: it is a more encompassing movement, or set of
impulses, that picked up speed in the fifteenth century and aimed to bring the
details of ordinary human life, in all its contingency and ambivalence, into
line with the demands of religious and cultural elites. In a more literary
idiom, “Reform” means the imposition of form upon content, with all the
gains and losses that attend such an imposition.
The chapters in this volume not only focus on different aspects of Taylor’s
story but also assess the relevance of the narrative character of A Secular Age dif-
ferently. Taylor’s book is most radically treated as a story, as opposed to history,
in the contributions by Joyce Dalsheim and Reinhard Schulze, whilst others give
it greater historical credibility, for example Jonathan Lanman and Oane Reitsma.
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A middle position, if you wish, is taken up by Courtney Bender, who considers
Taylor’s story as “true insofar as its narrative becomes part of the story that we
tell about ourselves.” In that line, Florian Zemmin regards Taylor’s story as a use-
ful heuristic tool for uncovering other stories of modernity, in this case Islamic
ones, while Samuel Shearn takes one kind of story – the genealogy – as a
point of contact between Taylor and Nietzsche, and Thomas Carlson assesses
the narrative pressure that Augustine’s account of time exerts on Taylor’s analy-
sis.Whether the book’s analysis is treated primarily as story or as history, mean-
while, a critique of A Secular Age recurring in all three sociological contributions
of this volume (the ones by Koenig, Bender, and Burchardt) is that Taylor ne-
glects the role of institutional power and conflicts around evolving secular con-
victions.
Social imaginaries
Taylor is concerned throughout the book with the interplay between explicit the-
ories and implicit background understandings. Elite secular ideas make their
way to broader populations by way of what he calls “social imaginaries.” The
origins of this concept, which Taylor elaborates in his book Modern Social Imag-
inaries from 2004, can be traced to an article published two years earlier as part
of a special journal issue on New Imaginaries (Taylor 2002). The members of the
working group behind this special issue employed the idea of social imaginary in
quite different ways; in Taylor’s case, however, Cornelius Castoriadis’s coinage of
the concept is still very visible. Castoriadis (1987) had introduced “[t]he idea of a
social imaginary as an enabling but not fully explicable symbolic matrix within
which a people imagine and act as world-making collective agents” (Gaonkar
2002). Social imaginaries are both fundamental and hard to pin down or delin-
eate; indeed, Castoriadis (1987: 128) likened imaginaries to “what Hegel called
‘the spirit of a people’.”
Taylor himself defines social imaginaries as incorporating “a sense of the
normal expectations that we have of each other; the kind of common under-
standing which enables us to carry out the collective practices which make up
our social life. This incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying
out the common practice” (ASA: 172). Taylor, himself a distinguished Hegel schol-
ar, actually locates the concept of social imaginaries in the Kantian tradition,
identifying their role with that of Kantian transcendental schemes.When a theo-
ry penetrates and transforms the social imaginary, “this process isn’t just one-
sided; a theory making over a social imaginary. The theory in coming to make
sense of the action is ‘glossed,’ as it were, given a particular shape as the context
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of these practices. Rather like Kant’s notion of an abstract category becoming
‘schematized’ when it is applied to reality in space and time, the theory is sche-
matized in the dense sphere of common practice” (ASA: 176). However, there re-
mains a central difference between Kant’s transcendental schemes and Taylor’s
social imaginaries. Whereas Kant’s transcendental schemes are universal and
mainly tailored to the use of scientific concepts, Taylor’s social imaginaries are
historical and related to the domain of human experiences.
The idea of social imaginaries, as distinguished from explicitly held doc-
trines or elaborated theories, alerts us to the importance of common implicit un-
derstandings lying behind disputes among religious and secular positions. In
this regard, the central aim of Taylor’s story in A Secular Age is to do justice
to the specificity of our secular age by articulating these shared implicit under-
standings, whether we consider ourselves religious or not. Following Heidegger,
Taylor defines these implicit understandings as our “pre-ontology” or “back-
ground” (ASA: 3, 13, passim). Since social imaginaries are deeply embedded in
our pre-ontology, we are in need of stories which make explicit the implicit
views lurking in the tacit background and situated in the long historical process
of modernity.
The concept of the social imaginary therefore does two distinct kinds of work
in A Secular Age. First, it aims to illuminate, from the inside as it were, what it
means to live in a secular age. The shared social imaginary of modern life is what
Taylor calls the “immanent frame.” While the immanent frame is not necessarily
closed to transcendence, its tacit world-picture includes a world defined by nat-
ural science and governed by impersonal laws and a social order that is histor-
ical in the sense that it has been created by actions that happened in historical
time. Thus, when Taylor says that it is a “crucial fact of our present spiritual pre-
dicament that it is historical,” he is in fact giving voice to a basic part of the im-
manent frame itself. He aims to give an account of our modern social imaginary
from within that same imaginary, and that makes his own account, again, an in-
terpretive one. Several of the contributions to this volume, notably those by Carl-
son, Jager, Shearn, and Reitsma, follow Taylor down this interpretive path, test-
ing his depiction of the immanent frame against alternative possibilities (those
found in Heidegger, Schiller, Nietzsche, and classical music, respectively).
Secondly, the concept of the social imaginary also aims to account for the
diffusion of elite theories to whole societies – to explain, that is to say, how
we became secular.Yet from the perspective of social science, the explanatory po-
tential of this concept is debatable. It remains unclear exactly how the interplay
of theory and imaginary works (see Bender this volume: 286fn4; Koenig this vol-
ume: 41). More fundamentally, the very concept of social imaginaries remains
somewhat vague and is problematically identified with abstract cultural entities
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(Strauss 2006; Zemmin this volume: 314–315). In this light it is even more inter-
esting that from the perspective of cognitive science, Jonathan Lanman in his
contribution to this volume argues that the concept of social imaginary could
be fruitfully operated with. At the other end of the spectrum, Reinhard Schulze
maintains that “social imaginary” should not be treated as a concept at all, since
it is a metaphor which works only within Taylor’s particular story. Florian Zem-
min argues that the concept can nevertheless be fruitfully applied to other con-
texts and stories, namely as a “heuristic tool.”
Central to the modern social imaginary as depicted by Taylor is the idea of
the separation between natural-supernatural or immanent-transcendent. While
Oane Reitsma demonstrates how post-romantic classical music absorbs and
(he argues) occasionally transcends that same distinction, Junaid Quadri and Jo-
hannes Stephan, in their contributions, trace these distinctions in an Islamic
context. Meanwhile, the chapters in the second section are concerned with the
normative premises and implications of this imaginary and with its limits and
contestations.
Taylor’s story among the disciplines
From the moment of its publication, A Secular Age has inspired disparate re-
sponses, and the essays gathered here testify to this diversity. Taken together,
the contributors represent nine distinct disciplines, and this variety of approach
yields a correspondingly various set of judgements about Taylor’s text. It might
be helpful, then, to imagine a sliding scale of interdisciplinary engagement. At
one extreme, one might extend Taylor’s argument more-or-less unmodified
into debates in one’s own discipline; at the other, one might criticize A Secular
Age from the perspective of a particular discipline. Though the contributions
gathered here necessarily differ in emphasis, all of them move dialectically be-
tween these poles. None simply import A Secular Age wholesale, nor simply dis-
parage it from a supposedly superior disciplinary standpoint.
With varying degrees of explicitness, one question occurs in each of the es-
says collected here: is Taylor’s account descriptive, interpretive, normative, or ex-
planatory? Put differently, does it aim to describe our current condition (the char-
acteristics of being Western and modern at this particular historical juncture)?
Does it aim to interpret that condition (to dwell on the possibilities and capaci-
ties that the secular age opens up and closes down)? Does it explain how we got
here (giving reasons for the evolution of the immanent frame, or proposing caus-
al accounts of how we moved from a condition of naive to reflexive belief)? Or
does it aim at a normative account (criticizing the modern condition, offering rea-
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sons for thinking of the immanent frame as open or closed, or proposing how we
might live under conditions of religious pluralism)? The short answer, of course,
is that A Secular Age aims to do all of the above – such is the ambition of this
ambitious book. But, as always, it is the question of emphasis – both Taylor’s
emphasis and the emphases of his readers – that will determine how we read
Taylor’s story.
We have organized the collection into four sections. While most chapters in
this volume interweave general reflections on the usability of A Secular Age with
a specific research project, the contributions assembled in the first section are
dedicated more exclusively to evaluating the general potential of Taylor’s story
for their respective disciplines. The second section treats the normative dimen-
sions of Taylor’s alternative story in A Secular Age, following Taylor’s own
lead, if not always his conclusions, by using the various problematics of plural-
ism to challenge the hegemony of mainstream secularization stories. In a more
interpretive vein, the third section uses the concept of “subtler language” to con-
sider alternative accounts of the secular age opened up by Taylor’s own descrip-
tive story. And the fourth section explores modern Islamic self-understandings
and stories of secularity. The next portions of this introduction contain summa-
ries and analyses of these four sections and their individual chapters.
Beginning the first section, Matthias Koenig explores the potential of A Sec-
ular Age for sociological theories of secularity and secularization. Summarizing
recent assessments of these theories, Koenig formulates three requirements to be
fulfilled by any alternative account of secularity: it must explain how secularity
became such an important and controversial category (1), it must integrate em-
pirical evidence pointing both to the decline of religion and to religious vitality
that varies by region, history, and population (2), and it must explain the diver-
sity of modern religious and political differentiation patterns in cross-national
and cross-cultural perspective (3). Closely examining the major premises, con-
cepts, and landmarks of A Secular Age, Koenig maintains that Taylor’s “cultural-
ist theory of modernity” clearly fulfills the first two requirements, yet fails to de-
liver on the third. For Koenig, Taylor’s story fruitfully brings up historical and
sociological questions which cannot be answered by large-scale narratives like
Taylor’s own.
The Protestant theologian Günter Thomas argues that Taylor’s story is fuel-
led not only by Christian but more specifically by Catholic convictions. Taylor’s
apologetic approach to history, he writes, results in an unfair treatment of the
historical role of Protestantism itself, which for Thomas is a story of “education
and freedom, which cannot simply be shelved under Reform.” And whilst Taylor
allegedly portrays a nostalgic Catholic mysticism as the only remedy for the irre-
versible result of the process of Reform, “Protestants rely on the many forms of
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the presence of the resurrected Christ through the Holy Spirit in real, communal
and thoroughly plural practices of faith, hope, and love.” Despite his rather crit-
ical reading of both Taylor’s historical narrative and its contemporary diagnosis,
however, Thomas points to significant challenges formulated in A Secular Age
that require an answer by Protestant theologians: a more nuanced relationship
to modernity and a Trinitarian theological account of the secular that locates
fullness neither exclusively in immanence nor in transcendence but dynamically
connects both.
Some readers, including several contributors to this volume, have criticized
A Secular Age for dwelling too much on broad-based cultural change and not
enough on specific institutional configurations and conflicts of interest. By con-
trast, Jonathan Lanman’s contribution, which considers the relevance of Taylor’s
story for the burgeoning field of cognitive science of religion (CSR), suggests that
pieces of a causal explanation do indeed exist in Taylor’s account. On first
glance, CSR seems methodologically alien to Taylor’s story. But Lanman thinks
that CSR should aim to complement philosophical and cultural interpretations
of religious experiences and actions with explanations of their underlying cogni-
tive dispositions. He suggests that CSR can complement Taylor’s account by of-
fering explanations for different levels of belief within the North Atlantic world,
from the growth of new religious movements to the rise of non-theism. The evi-
dence from cognitive science is that levels of religious belief depend less upon
what people say than upon what they do. Thus, the disembodiment of religion
brought about by social differentiation (secularity 1) combined with changed
conditions of belief (secularity 3) might in turn yield lower levels of belief and
participation (secularity 2). Though Lanman remarks that taking social imagina-
ries as objects of analysis in the study of religious cognition remains a challenge,
his proposal has the effect of supporting Taylor’s contention that changes in the
conditions of belief can causally influence levels of religious participation. In
this way, his contribution offers an implicit response to the sociological charge,
voiced here by Koenig and Bender, that Taylor is not able to provide a causal ac-
count of religious change.
Normative stories in a secular age
The normative discussion about the exact definition of ‘religion’ and ‘secularity’
is an old one. But in A Secular Age Taylor gives that discussion a new and un-
expected twist. A Secular Age is explicitly framed as an alternative story to main-
stream master narratives of secularization, in part because Taylor believes that
the hegemony of such narratives has in fact helped to bring about the present
Introduction 7
secular age. Taylor’s alternative ‘Reform Master Narrative,’ therefore, is itself a
normative account as well as a descriptive one. If Taylor’s alternative story
about the genesis and evolution of the secular age is accepted as a more convinc-
ing genealogical account of modernity, then it implies as well an alternative nor-
mative approach to the contemporary relation between secularity and religion.
At the end of A Secular Age, Taylor states that in the account he is offering
“there is no place for unproblematic breaks with a past which is simply left be-
hind” (ASA: 772). Like Robert Bellah, he believes that with regard to people’s
past imaginaries and convictions “nothing is ever lost.” This emphasis on a nar-
rative of slow change works against a reading of Taylor’s initial question (“why
was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western so-
ciety, while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?”)
as itself positing a sharp break or abrupt transition. Taylor thinks that simply
breaking with a problematic past may give rise to the repetition of its horrors
in the modern secular era. He opts instead for a story, through which a fusion
of past and present horizons may take place. Especially in the domain of
human affairs, where “understanding the other” (Taylor 2011) is at stake, this
model of a “fusion of horizons” across both geographic and historical distance
is related to the art of telling stories, rather than to the construction of scientific
theories.
Taylor proposes that this plea for a “fusion of horizons” – the expression is
borrowed from Gadamer – and for normative stories other than those coming
from the epistemological tradition is applicable to the contemporary relation be-
tween religious and secular stances. Both Gadamer and Taylor challenge any as-
sumption that identities in a secular age are self-enclosed. “Our past is sediment-
ed in our present,” as Taylor puts it (ASA: 29), and this demands an equilibrium
between acknowledging completely different ways of being human on the one
hand and living our own way on the other. It goes without saying that this equi-
librium is difficult to achieve (Taylor 2011: 31–38).
From divergent perspectives, the five chapters in the second section all focus
upon working with A Secular Age in order to approach that balance of under-
standing. Guido Vanheeswijck in his chapter asks whether the terms ‘post-secu-
lar’ and ‘post-metaphysical stories’ coined by Jürgen Habermas are humble
words or words already surreptitiously transformed into arrogant ones, that is,
whether they are successful or not in coping with the predicament of ‘under-
standing the other.’ Inspired by Taylor’s position in A Secular Age and in subse-
quent essays, Vanheeswijck traces the consequences of divergent interpretations
of these two words regarding the role of religious and metaphysical arguments or
“deep commitments” in the current debate on the place of religion in the public
sphere. He suggests that the controversy around the interpretation of both words
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is not only due to different epistemological premises, but to divergent political
stances as well. Taylor himself has argued that achieving mutual respect and tol-
erance in this regard is the primary task of democratic societies. Following Tay-
lor, Vanheeswijck proposes that this goal is less amenable to the neutrality of
procedural rationality than to the imaginative force of what he calls “subtle
words.” Therefore, only normative stories that are aware of the subtlety of
words can articulate the implicit background understandings that all partici-
pants carry with them into discussion.
Coming at the question of neutrality and its limits from a different angle,
Aurélia Bardon shows why the liberal pluralism characteristic of our secular
age is itself not a neutral story. Taylor’s commitment to moral and epistemolog-
ical pluralisms reveals the fact that the immanent frame, which here stands for
modern liberal society, is in fact based on specific normative and epistemologi-
cal assumptions. Only such assumptions can explain why we expect and accept
both moral and epistemological pluralism. Bardon makes it clear that these nor-
mative and epistemological assumptions are themselves limited and cannot in-
clude certain metaphysical claims. In other words, the liberal commitment to
moral and epistemological pluralisms is not and cannot be based on the validity
of metaphysical pluralism. This is why in Taylor’s view “the language of some
public bodies, for instance courts, has to be free from premises drawn from
one or another position.” If liberal pluralism is taken seriously as a normative
story, according to Bardon, the official position has to be no position at all.
The first two contributions in this section mainly elaborate on Taylor’s posi-
tion; the next two are more critical of his general stance when applied to specific
situations.
Marian Burchardt explores how A Secular Age is related to the normative
claims in the fierce debates about secularism in Quebec, and to Taylor’s own po-
litical interventions in them. He begins by examining Taylor’s argument that
strong versions of secularization, based on the idea of emancipation from reli-
gion, reify secularism as a goal in its own right instead of being subservient to
promoting the values of liberty, equality, and solidarity. Next, he evaluates Tay-
lor’s claim that the traditional view of religion as playing an ambiguous, if not
detrimental, role in the promotion of these values must be reassessed and per-
haps even reversed. In the second part of his essay, Burchardt explores how in
modern-day Quebec, “this rehabilitation underwrites the project to respect and
promote religious diversity.” However, it also clashes with notions of secularity
as a “lever of national unity and progress.”
In her chapter on “other sovereignties in Israel/Palestine,” Joyce Dalsheim,
too, claims that Taylor’s story in A Secular Age is not innocent. In particular, she
is concerned with those who live in the shadows of the hegemonic secular moral
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order Taylor describes in A Secular Age and who can be produced as enemies of
the order itself. Ironically enough, the production of such enemies is especially
important in contemporary attempts at peacemaking. This is because attempts at
peacemaking take place within the modern social imaginary, an important part
of which is the idea of “the sovereign people.” As Dalsheim shows, some people
in Israel/Palestine have begun thinking and acting in ways that pose challenges
to the “sovereignty” component that underlies the modern nation-state. Dal-
sheim focuses on three examples – each of which poses a different challenge
to what is generally thought of popular sovereignty and may therefore be consid-
ered “spoilers” of peace. She tells these alternative stories to mark the borders of
the moral order of a secular age in which conventional peacemaking is carried
out.
In the final contribution to this section, Reinhard Schulze poses the funda-
mental question of why storytelling has reemerged in the last decade as a “mean-
ing-producing force.” Taylor’s assertion in A Secular Age that “we (modern West-
erners) can’t understand ourselves except via […] narratives” (Taylor 2010: 300)
becomes for Schulze a method for convincing rather than verifying, whose meta-
phors and arguments only work within the story itself. The “open secularism” for
which Taylor has argued elsewhere is also the endpoint of A Secular Age, Schulze
proposes, and its goal is that of an affirmative genealogy: reassuring the West of
its particularity and excellence in an era of globalization. Noting the Christian
roots of the concept ‘secular’ itself, Schulze proposes not a non-Christian geneal-
ogy of secularity but a more Foucauldian genealogy of the modern orders of re-
ligion and society, which in almost all great traditions “grew out of a unified nor-
mative order which had related the world in its totality to a transcendental
truth.”
Taylor’s story and the subtler languages
The questions of meaning and meaningfulness raised in Schulze’s contribution
are the explicit topics of this volume’s third group of essays. Midway through A
Secular Age, Taylor writes that “the development of modern poetics, and in gen-
eral the languages of art, has enabled people to explore […] meanings with their
ontological commitments as it were in suspense” (ASA: 351). Here Taylor propos-
es that Romantic and post-Romantic aesthetics developed or invented a lan-
guage that captured the unique phenomenology of the secular age. There were
unbelievers before Romanticism, of course, but Taylor claims that, beyond a
few elite enclaves, neither their experience nor the experiences of their believing
neighbors could have been rendered in the open, tentative fashion that has be-
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come familiar to us in the post-Romantic age. Rhetorically, meanwhile, Taylor’s
claim about modern poetics serves as something of an allegory for his book’s
own method. The key phrases of the first half of the book – the “buffered
self,” the “work of reform,” the “great disembedding,” “discipline,” and “social
imaginaries” – are terms drawn from or developed out of social and philosoph-
ical theories. Taylor’s invocation of terms like “commitment” and “suspension”
in the second half, then, marks a shift toward the languages of authenticity
that will preoccupy him in the remainder of A Secular Age, and that have con-
cerned him as well in earlier publications (Taylor 1989; 1992). Thus the appeal
to suspension is itself suspended between the two halves of A Secular Age, a
pause or hesitation before the book pitches fully into its discussion of modernity
proper.
Taylor marks this moment with a term borrowed from the English Romantic
poet Percy Shelley: the “subtler language.” That term signals a new social imag-
inary: where once artists could assume a common lexicon and a common man-
ner of interpreting both natural and social worlds as structured by a divine hier-
archy and benevolent order, that assumption no longer held true by the early
years of the nineteenth century. The subtler languages of artistic practice thus
come to imagine creativity in a new way, as a space of immanent possibility
or what Shelley himself called the “vitally metaphorical” quality of authentic
language that “marks the before unapprehended relations of things” ([1821]
2002: 512). Romantic artists, Taylor writes, are “trying to say something for
which no adequate terms exist and whose meaning has to be sought in [the]
works rather than in a pre-existing lexicon of references” (ASA: 354).
It is important to be clear that this is not a blueprint for unrestrained sub-
jectivity or self-projection – that is a misinterpretation that haunts, Taylor thinks,
some aspects of the secular age, which equates authenticity with self-determin-
ing freedom. By contrast, the subtler languages do indeed hook onto some as-
pect of the world; in a philosophic idiom, they have an ‘intentional object.’
But it remains the case that apprehension of that object may not be widely
shared and therefore must be disclosed by the constitutive activity of poetic lan-
guage itself. Taylor seems to be suggesting that, properly read, the subtler lan-
guages hold the key to understanding our secular age itself, to its distinctive
feel and mood, its capacities and limitations, its cross-pressures and unquiet
frontiers. In this way, the subtler languages are the languages of the immanent
frame – the languages of secularity, even if their content may be overtly reli-
gious. This helps to explain why Taylor turns increasingly to literary and artistic
examples in the second half of the book.
The notion of subtler languages invites a broadly interpretive relationship to
Taylor’s own text. A Secular Age is, after all, a story, and stories demand inter-
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pretation. Accordingly, the chapters gathered in the third section consider the in-
terpretive possibilities opened up by Taylor’s account.
Colin Jager’s contribution,which closely analyzes Taylor’s own investment in
romanticism, particularly in Shelley and Schiller, suggests a reading of Taylor’s
story that carries forward the political claims of the book’s first section – that
secularization-as-Reform was an overt project of elites to separate themselves
from popular culture – into the subtler and more aesthetic matters treated in
the latter half of A Secular Age. In implicit disagreement with Schulze and others
for whom Taylor’s account is too uncritically celebratory of a certain model of
Western modernity, Jager sees Taylor’s turn to the aesthetic not as de-politicizing
but rather as a means of carrying forward the book’s loosely New Left politics
within what Jager calls a “fugitive space.”
The musicologist Oane Reitsma’s contribution adopts Taylor’s framework in
order to help explain a basic fact about modern art, and music in particular.
Whereas music was once embedded in a larger cultural and social matrix – ar-
chitecture, liturgy, social hierarchy – that contributed to its meaning and signif-
icance, music from the late eighteenth century onward had largely to create
those contexts for itself. In the abstract, silent, and artificial space of the concert
hall, Reitsma argues, music achieves its own “absolute autonomy.” He analyzes
the identity of post-romantic musical works themselves as markers of the buf-
fered identities of modernity, the secular space of the romantic-era concert
hall, with its standardized seating and relative equality of rank, and, finally,
the experience of time within modern musical culture. Though largely accepting
Taylor’s analysis of the secular age, Reitsma shows how close attention to indi-
vidual works of art reveals that they can “also fulfill a kairotic function in a sec-
ular age.” Ultimately, this seems a more hopeful description of the secular land-
scape than that offered by Taylor himself.
Schiller begins his analysis of what he calls “aesthetic education” with the
seemingly intractable conflict between will and desire. Friedrich Nietzsche, an-
other of Taylor’s philosophical interlocutors, also begins with this conflict. But
unlike Schiller, Nietzsche does not think this opposition can be resolved by
the free play of aesthetics. Rather, he wants to subvert it altogether. Samuel
Shearn nevertheless shows in his contribution that Taylor’s account of the secu-
lar age remains deeply invested in a Nietzschean critique of humanism and in
Nietzsche’s genealogical method. Many commentators have noted that Taylor’s
own theological commitments circulate throughout A Secular Age; Shearn’s
essay, by contrast, offers a deeper reading of Taylor’s a-theological sources. Cer-
tainly, Taylor in the end proposes that Christianity is superior to Nietzschean
anti-humanism because it provides more resources for effecting a transformation
that doesn’t mutilate our humanity. But, writing from the perspective of Christian
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theology, Shearn shows how Taylor’s theological thinking is enriched by his con-
tact with Nietzsche.
The final two essays in this section are somewhat more skeptical about the
adequacy of subtler languages for capturing the nuances of the secular age. Like
Shearn, Thomas Carlson turns to a thinker of the counter-enlightenment – Hei-
degger, in this case – in order to explore the landscape of contemporary spiritual
options. But unlike Shearn, Carlson uses this counter-enlightenment tradition to
develop an account of love as a “secular mood.” Against Taylor’s claim that the
death of a loved one creates a distinctively modern crisis of meaning, Carlson
shows how Heidegger’s reading of Augustine enables him to develop an account
of love that accepts mortality and does not long for eternity. Taylor, of course,
finds Heidegger’s well-known critique of instrumental rationality and empty
technocratic time very congenial – just as he finds Nietzsche’s critique of human-
ism useful. But Carlson insists that Taylor misses a crucial element of the coun-
ter-enlightenment tradition stretching from Nietzsche to Derrida, namely that it
is not simply critical of the scientific quest for certainty but also resists the kind
of temporal consummation central to Augustinian-Hegelian thinking. To love
someone, Carlson argues, is to affirm their mortality and vulnerability. Thus,
he concludes, Taylor’s reading of the relation between time and meaning, as ex-
emplified for instance in his notion of “fullness,” causes him not only to misread
Heidegger but to misread the mood of the secular age itself, which is better pre-
pared to deal with death than Taylor is able to acknowledge.
Courtney Bender, likewise, interprets the notion of a subtler language as
largely compensatory and dependent upon a notion of lost wholeness. Her eth-
nographic account of the contemporary North American spiritual landscape, like
Carlson’s more philosophical version, takes issue with Taylor’s language of “full-
ness,” whose nostalgia, she concludes, leads Taylor to miss the possibilities that
are actually available within the modern spiritual scene. She notes that in nine-
teenth-century America, for example, romanticism described less a place of ontic
suspension than of interconnection, particularly as the spirits and experiences of
the Western frontier began penetrating urban drawing rooms and parlors. In a
similar manner, Bender’s ethnographic account of contemporary spiritual prac-
titioners in and around Cambridge, Massachusetts, indicates that these subjects
too remain porous, open to visitations from worlds beyond the skin and deeply
connected to historical traditions. The sensibility of today’s subtler languages,
then, may be more relational and less buffered than Taylor allows.
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Islamic stories
Taylor offers A Secular Age as one among several stories of Western secularity. He
himself refers to two other accounts: the subtraction narratives that are his run-
ning target, and the kind of Intellectual Deviation story developed most promi-
nently by the theologian John Milbank (ASA: 773–776). However, these options
are hardly exhaustive. As shown in the contributions of Koenig and Burchardt
in this volume, most recent sociological theory-making cannot really be called
a “subtraction” story. And neither Taylor nor Milbank’s so-called “Radical Ortho-
doxy,” or even a combination of their accounts, will be the last word from the
side of Christian thinkers or theologians. Indeed, in the first section of this vol-
ume, the Protestant theologian Günter Thomas points to an alternative Protes-
tant account of secularity, criticizing the role Taylor assigns to Protestantism
in his own story. There are, moreover, a range of distinctions and issues of ‘dif-
ference’ that are not addressed in Taylor’s cultural account of modernity. The
issue of gender is entirely absent, as are the problems pertaining to the role of
sexuality, class distinctions, immigration, disability, etc. Whilst it is important
to keep these other differences in mind, giving them their full due would have
made for a totally different work than A Secular Age. Aware of the particularity
of Taylor’s approach and its concommitant omissions, this volume focuses on
one ‘other’ of the secular West which Taylor explicitly addresses, namely Islam.
Islam is a crucial ‘other’ in and to Western self-understandings in general, at
once constituent of and set apart from the West. However we conceive of it
specifically, the secular is widely regarded as a central characteristic of (Western)
modernity, and within this formation Islam marks a crucial boundary. There have
thus evolved Western and Islamic visions and stories of modernity, which cling
to and perpetuate imagined characteristics and boundaries, quite detached from
the historical record of entanglements between Christendom and Islamdom. No
other ‘other’ plays a more significant role in the formation of modern Western
self-understanding. The historical evolution of this formation and the power
mechanisms at work therein have been aptly discussed in recent scholarship
(Hurd 2010; Salama 2011). Taylor’s “West,” like any other civilization, is not a
given but a construction and an imagination. However, this imagined ‘Western
civilization’ has become highly relevant as a marker of identity and of modernity.
Even though modern self-understanding only evolved in the “imperial encoun-
ter” (van der Veer 2001), it was most closely associated with the European tradi-
tion and then with the West, in which it consequently has been developed “most
pronouncedly, albeit not without ambiguities” (Wagner 2014: 294). Importantly,
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many of those identifying themselves as ‘non-Westerners’ have regarded the
West as the epitome of modernity, for better or for worse.
The stories that non-Western Islamic societies tell about secularity and mod-
ernity are addressed in the three chapters of this volume’s final section, which
combine case studies on Islamic contexts with general theoretical, historical,
and methodological considerations of the usability of A Secular Age beyond
the West. Writing from within Islamic Studies as a confessionally neutral disci-
pline, the authors do not develop an Islamic story of modernity themselves.
Yet their findings clearly indicate the possibility of such Islamic stories, whether
because of convergent developments within Islamic and Western self-under-
standings or because of Western (colonial and postcolonial) influence on Islamic
societies. In their details, these Islamic stories will of course markedly differ from
Taylor’s story.
Florian Zemmin in his chapter argues that Taylor’s story despite its particu-
larity can fruitfully be used for research on modern Islamic self-understandings.
A Secular Age is for Zemmin a useful heuristic tool precisely because Taylor
grasps the profound background understandings of modernity “common not
only to believers and non-believers in the West but possibly also to non-Western-
ers.” Islamic societies, too, exhibit all three of Taylor’s levels of secularity. More-
over, it is not only modern Westerners who understand their present selves his-
torically. Rather than a different epistemology, it was “the asymmetric power
constellations of colonialism […] that have made it harder for Muslim intellectu-
als to bring forward their own stories.” Zemmin complements his general consid-
erations with a case study on the concept of ‘society’ in the modernist Islamic
journal al-Manar.
Complementing Zemmin’s focus on ‘society,’ Junaid Quadri’s chapter consid-
ers the effect of the transcendent/immanent distinction for modern Islamic ‘reli-
gion.’ While Taylor has been criticized for neglecting non-Western contributions
to the evolving modern understanding of religion, Quadri turns the tables on that
critique by asking what sort of “conceptual reconfiguring this momentous intel-
lectual shift in the West proceeded to make possible, or indeed necessary, for
colonized peoples and knowledge-traditions.” How well does the transcen-
dence-immanence distinction travel to the Muslim world? Analyzing legal treatis-
es from the Hanafi school of law, Quadri shows that in pre-modern times reli-
gious affairs, for which the sighting of the Ramadan moon is an example,
were imbricated as much with immanence as with transcendence. In modernity,
then, religion and religious matters came to be exclusively relegated to transcen-
dence, simultaneously making room for an increasingly autonomous worldly
sphere.
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Johannes Stephan, who is attending to a slightly earlier moment in Arab in-
tellectual history, also discerns the increasing autonomy and importance of the
immanent sphere in the writings by two pioneers of the nahḍa (Arab Renais-
sance) he analyzes, the Egyptian Muslim Rifaʿa al-Tahtawi and the Syrian Chris-
tian Fransis Marrash. These prominent writers allow Stephan to approach and
grasp Arab modernity as reflected in story-telling, and A Secular Age becomes
a hermeneutic tool to make sense of and contextualize new modes of narration
that emerged in modern Arabic literature. In the stories of these Arab intellectu-
als, “human society can develop independently from transcendent interference.”
Yet revelation did not disappear but actually regained importance as a marker of
the cultural and historical entity that Arab thinkers understood themselves to be-
long to. Arab or Islamic civilization could thus be conceived as an entity in its
own right which was participating in the same universal process as the West,
that is, in the common (hi‐)story of progress.
Enchantment, unbundling, and narrative
In his Afterword to this volume, Charles Taylor reiterates some of the main
themes of A Secular Age and responds to several of the matters raised by the vol-
ume’s contributors. He rejects the charge of nostalgia, raised implicitly or explic-
itly by several contributors to this volume (Carlson, Bender, Thomas). And he of-
fers several interconnected reasons for the modern sense that both belief and
nonbelief are options. Some of these will be familiar to readers of A Secular
Age itself: disenchantment (both the demise of magic and the transformation
of a hierarchically-tiered cosmos) and the consequent development of the imma-
nent frame as our shared background condition. Taylor however here distin-
guishes between two kinds of enchantment, the first a narrower one, adopted
from Weber, having to do with a sense of magical forces operating in the
world, and the second a more capacious sense of attunement or kinship with
the world beyond the self. This distinction matters when we come to speak of
the secular age as one of disenchantment, for the demise of the first kind of en-
chantment does not necessarily lead to the demise of the second – though for
Taylor and others on what he calls the “romantic side of this question,” the
two seem tightly bound.
Taylor also introduces the concept of “unbundling,” and this in two related
senses: the unbundling of forms of belonging (family, parish, nation) and the un-
bundling of spiritual and other activities previously gathered under the church.
This seems closely related to social differentiation and therefore part of what
Taylor calls “secularity 1” in A Secular Age. (As a reminder, secularity 1 for Taylor
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is the withdrawal of religion from public life, while secularity 2 is the falling-off
of belief and practice, and secularity 3, his main concern in A Secular Age, in-
volves the background conditions against which the religious and the secular
show up as such.) The shift of emphasis that Taylor makes in his Afterword is
nevertheless significant; joining unbundling to disenchantment enables Taylor
to speak more precisely of the social order, and offers something of a response
to those readers, in this volume and elsewhere, who have thought that Taylor
concentrates too much on ideas at the expense of socio-political structures. Im-
plicitly, Taylor’s point seems to be that spiritual and material factors are mutu-
ally dependent, and that secularity 1 and secularity 3 are perhaps more closely
bound together than the depiction in A Secular Age suggests.
Finally, Taylor reiterates his position on two matters that emerge as key
throughout the present volume. The first is the role of narrative, of the stories
that societies and cultures tell about themselves and understand themselves to
be a part of; the second is Taylor’s commitment to the multiple modernities the-
sis and to the kind of comparative work that it makes possible. Interestingly, the
comparative mode that Taylor favors both here and in other publications tends to
treat cultures or civilizations as relatively self-enclosed entities, whereas a num-
ber of contributors to this volume insist upon a more fractured series of exchang-
es within as well as among cultures, for instance on the question of the imma-
nent-transcendent distinction and indeed the very development of the idea of
‘religion’ itself. Thus the question of ‘cultures,’ and their relative enclosure or
openness, remains a key methodological issue in Taylor’s work and indeed in
the question of secularity itself. On the matter of stories, meanwhile, Taylor
writes that narrativity is essential to his project. He reconfirms his sense of
what we might call the performative value of stories: that they are true insofar
as they become part of a given society’s self-understanding. Moreover, he sug-
gests, experience of any kind is itself always embedded in a narrative, replete
not with bare data but with a “certain construal of what is to be explained.” Per-
haps, then, we can read A Secular Age in just this fashion: as a narrative, a pre-
sentation of experience produced by an immensely gifted and generous writer, a
story as true and compelling as he, and we, choose to make it.
Working with A Secular Age
This volume is rounded off with an annotated bibliography of previous respons-
es to A Secular Age, compiled by Florian Zemmin. Looking both back and ahead,
this bibliography gives an overview of the debate sparked by Taylor’s book so far
and functions as a resource for future contributions. Restricting itself to journal
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articles, essays, and books written in English, the bibliography still comprises
122 entries.
This flourishing industry of commentary may seem remarkable. After all, the
book is very long, often repetitive, and occasionally frustrating in its digressions
and swerves. At the same time, this very capaciousness makes it a rich fund of
ideas and arguments. Very few writers have Taylor’s interdisciplinary reach.
Moreover, the book entered a field whose activity and vibrancy made it ripe
for a defining statement. Even though a good deal of the response to A Secular
Age was variously critical, the book has served to invigorate and galvanize
broader debates about religion and secularity. These two concepts remain funda-
mental to the (self‐)understandings of modernity, and the relation between reli-
gion and society has been hotly debated during recent decades, as the identifi-
cation of modernization with the decline of religion loses its explanatory force.
In this regard, Taylor does much more than argue for the religious genealogy of
secularity or the continued salience of religion in modernity. Indeed, he directs
our attention to the most fundamental background assumptions of modernity
shared by all modern people, believers and non-believers alike. From this it fol-
lows that, contrary to one common assumption, controversies between religious
and secular positions do not necessarily concern fundamental epistemological
conflicts but rather play out on a common, if contested, ground. Taylor’s “secular
age” is not equivalent to an “age of secularism” but is rather a synonym for
‘modernity,’ in which both religious and secular stances have become an option.
The mutual dependency of religion and secularity also points to a dilemma.
What are the other ‘others’ of religion, and how do we get analytic purchase on
them? This is the question addressed in the title of this book series, Religion and
Its Others. Taylor’s implicit answer in A Secular Age is that secularity sets the
conditions not only for religion but for modern life in all its varieties. By the
same token, Taylor’s work points the way toward analyses of such ‘others’ of re-
ligion as exclusive humanism, atheism, or religious indifference. In our contem-
porary societies, where the division between religion and secularity has become
dominant, tracing the relation between that divide and others (queer/straight,
human/animal, eg.) is work that still largely remains to be done. How might
one go about telling such stories? Though the chapters in this volume cannot an-
swer this question, they do jointly illuminate the central categories of modernity,
religion, and secularity from which an answer might come. In the meantime, we
are confident that A Secular Age has been remarkably, even uniquely, fruitful as a
tool for interdisciplinary dialogue, and we would be pleased if readers from var-
ious disciplines would share in this estimation.
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